Social protection and its effectiveness in tackling child labour: the case of internal child migrants in Indonesia

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1 Introduction

There is growing recognition amongst policymakers that social protection policies and programmes are uniquely placed to reduce child labour because they directly address its root causes: tackling simultaneously the poverty, exclusion and vulnerability that compel families to depend on the meagre incomes they can earn by sending their children to work. Social protection can also address the underlying social and economic causes that prevent children from attending school. Nevertheless, particular social protection schemes vary significantly in their ability to tackle child labour – depending on their specific features and the characteristics of the children they target (ILO, 2012).

There is an urgent need to better understand the types of vulnerabilities faced by different children, in order to distinguish the social protection systems that can adequately meet their needs and make these more effective. This would enable the design and implementation of social protection policies and programmes to become better informed on child labour and ensure their maximum impact in eliminating its core causes.

The present paper focuses on internal child migrants in Indonesia as a specific category of vulnerable children for whom better policies could make a direct and significant change. Global estimates suggest that there are roughly four times as many internal migrants as

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2 Child labour is defined by the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Convention on the minimum age for admission to employment, 1973 (No. 138), as including three types of work: work undertaken by children below the nationally defined minimum age for employment, which should not normally be less than 15; hazardous work undertaken by children below 18; and light work undertaken by children below 13. The minimum age for employment in Indonesia is 15.

3 Internal child migration is the movement of children below the age of 18, moving within the boundaries of a nation state within a given period. It can occur independently or with families and may be either permanent or temporary. For the purpose of this paper, we limit our focus to those children who migrate voluntarily, rather than being the victims of trafficking or a forceful move coming about through war, conflict or natural disaster. For the purposes of the statistical analysis conducted in this paper, internal migration is defined as movement across district boundaries for a period of at least 6 months.
international and that they tend to be from poorer, more vulnerable sections of society (UNDP, 2009). In Indonesia, many internal migrants are children under the age of 18, a significant number of which migrate in ways which make them particularly vulnerable to child labour, including the worst forms of child labour. As long as these dynamics remain poorly understood, they will remain opaque in the context of expanding Indonesia’s social protection system.

An estimated four million 5-17 year olds are engaged in child labour in Indonesia, damaging not only their immediate well-being but also their future potential, making tackling child labour an urgent policy priority (Understanding Children's Work (UCW) Programme, 2012). In order for exploitative child labour to be eliminated there needs to be a better understanding of how to reach out to these children and for solid evidence of what works in specific circumstances (UNICEF, 2012).

The findings presented in this paper have been informed by a thorough literature review and semi-structured interviews with specialists and field staff working on social protection, migration and child labour in Indonesia. The statistical analysis described below was primarily based on the Indonesia Population and Housing Census 2010, with kind permission from IPUMS International.

The objectives of this paper are threefold: (i) to identify specific categories of internal child migrants who are particularly vulnerable to child labour; (ii) to establish the extent to which Indonesia’s current social protection system mitigates this vulnerability; and (iii) to offer concrete recommendations for how it could be made more effective.

The rest of the paper is divided up as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the literature linking social protection, internal migration and child labour; Section 3 presents a statistical overview of child labour and internal child migration in Indonesia; Section 4 examines Indonesia’s current social protection policies and programmes in terms of their effectiveness to reach and protect internal child migrants; Section 5 concludes; Section 6 sums up a number of recommendations for policies and future research.

2 Literature Review

This section provides an overview of existing theoretical and empirical evidence on the links between social protection, internal migration and child labour. It centres around two key
questions: How does social protection mitigate child labour (2.1) and to what extent are internal child migrants vulnerable to child labour (2.2)?

2.1 How does social protection mitigate child labour?

The term ‘social protection’ encompasses a range of policy initiatives and services, all of which aim to address poverty, exclusion and vulnerability as a means of promoting human welfare; facilitating social cohesion; and contributing to economic performance and fair growth. It can include such policy mechanisms as direct cash transfers to poor families; access to health care services and health insurance; food-based programmes; and the provision of training programs for the unemployed. Access to adequate social protection is recognised by the United Nations (UN) as a basic right and is one of the four strategic objectives of the ILO’s Decent Work agenda.

Although the root causes of child labour are highly complex and can vary significantly between contexts, by far the closest determinant is poverty. Poverty forces families to make difficult decisions about whether to keep their children in education and compels poor families to depend on the meagre incomes that can be earned by sending children to work. In turn, child labour perpetuates poverty by keeping children out of school, severely limiting their future prospects and their chances of obtaining decent work as adults. This assertion is well supported by robust evidence showing that child labour rates are higher in poorer countries; and that within countries incidences of child labour are more common in poorer households (ILO, 2012).

There is a growing body of evidence which demonstrates the crucial role that social protection can play in mitigating these vulnerabilities and a growing awareness amongst policymakers that any meaningful and substantive action to reduce child labour needs to prioritise reducing poverty through the provision of social protection services.

Social protection can help to prevent child labour through three direct mechanisms; first, improving the economic position of households, enabling them to keep children in school for longer and reducing the necessity to send children to work; second, increasing the resilience of households to economic shocks making them less likely to have to resort to taking children out of school and into work; and third, through creating positive incentives to keep children in school and out of work, for example by making social protection benefits conditional on the achievement of certain health and education objectives. In addition to their preventative functions, social protection initiatives can also provide support and protection to child
labourers themselves by facilitating their rehabilitation or ensuring that they have basic standards of security and protection.

As a result, there has been growing recognition of the need to design and implement ‘child-sensitive’ social protection to ensure that these benefits are maximised and that social protection systems are responsive to the specific vulnerabilities faced by children, including in relation to child labour. In support of these objectives, there is a growing body of research and evidence which seeks to evaluate existing social protection mechanisms and to identify ways in which they could be made even more effective in the fight against child labour. The majority of existing research has focused on the role of cash transfers. Cash transfers can help to boost the incomes of poor families, smooth consumption and protect against economic shocks making it easier to send children to school and households less reliant on income earned from sending children to work. When combined with conditionalities, which link cash transfers to positive behaviours, further positive incentives can be generated. This can either happen directly – for example in Ghana where recipients of must abstain from the use of child labour (ODI 2013) – or indirectly, as is the case in Indonesia and elsewhere – where recipients must ensure that children are enrolled in school.

The ILO’s World Report on Child Labour 2012 draws on rigorous impact evaluations to elucidate specific mechanisms by which social protection mechanisms can support efforts against child labour, and to provide concrete recommendations for how child labour concerns can be more effectively mainstreamed into social protection systems. This report finds that the impact of specific social protection schemes on child labour varies significantly between programmes and depends on a range of factors. For example, cash transfers to poor families were found to be particularly effective when combined with supply-side schooling initiatives and less effective where they are invested in productive activities such as land and microfinance.

A recent study by Understanding Children’s Work (UCW), an inter-agency research project between the ILO, World Bank and UNICEF, found that the impact of conditional cash transfers on child labour differs considerably between countries and programmes, and that they are typically higher when child labour rates are higher and the margin for improvement is greater (Understanding Children's Work (UCW) Programme, 2012). Social assistance programmes that are focused of children have the greatest impact on child welfare and they tend to work better when a commitment to child welfare is high on the political agenda.
Conversely, the impact of programmes that are not explicitly focused on children is more mixed and can result in either positive or negative spill-overs (UNICEF, 2012).

2.2 To what extent are internal child migrants vulnerable to child labour?

Research and evidence paints a complex picture of internal child migration. On the one hand, evidence suggests that it can reduce child labour by raising incomes, reducing poverty and improving educational outcomes. For example, a study in Indonesia found that, on average, children who migrate within the country record permanent, positive and large effects on measures of education and health and that compared to similar individuals who remain in rural areas and that children who migrate to urban areas within Indonesia increase their educational attainment by around four years (Suryadarma & Resosudarmo, 2011). However, evidence also suggests that these benefits are not equally distributed and that internal migration can also be associated with particular risk factors which make children especially vulnerable to joining the labour force prematurely or engaging in hazardous work. These vulnerabilities can relate to the characteristics of migrant children; the types of migration which is undertaken; or the situation of migrants on arrival at their destination.

2.2.1 Vulnerabilities relating to the characteristics of migrant children

Poverty

Poverty has a significant impact on the type of migration which is undertaken and on the situation of migrants at their place of arrival. Poor people are more likely to migrate internally, partly because international migration is less accessible because of the high costs that can be involved. Evidence also suggests that poor people are more likely to migrate in unsafe ways; including seasonally; that poor children are more likely to migrate for work; and that on arrival they are likely to end up living in similar poverty (DFID 2012).

A study from Pakistan showed that migrants with ‘low prior social endowments’ are particularly vulnerable when they migrate internally because they are likely to become involved in informal economic activities, including begging and petty crime (Gazdar, 2003).

Gender

Gender can expose migrants to specific risks and challenges because girls and boys tend to migrate in different circumstances and have access to different opportunities at their destination. Evidence from the Population Council (2013) has shown that, compared with
migrant girls, migrant boys have larger social networks and migrate with more support from friends and family and that on their arrival they have access to greater number of opportunities. The limited range of occupations available to migrant girls who are above the minimum age of employment makes them particularly vulnerable to conditions which amount to child labour. In addition girls who migrate are more likely than boys to fall victim to sexual exploitation and trafficking.

2.2.2 Vulnerabilities relating to the type of migration undertaken

Independent child migration

Independent child migration refers to children below 18 years of age who migrate without being accompanied by a parent or guardian. It is inextricably linked to child labour because the majority of children who migrate by themselves do so in order to work. The particular vulnerability faced by internal child migrants has been explicitly recognised by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants; “children who are unaccompanied or separated from their parents are particularly vulnerable to human rights violations and abuses at all stages of the migration process” (United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, 2013). They face a range of risks, particularly because they lack adult supervision and protection; are isolated from traditional familial and community networks; may end up living and working on the street; and are routinely exposed to violence, coercion and exploitation.

A study into the education outcomes of migrants to Greater Jakarta found that educational outcomes were much worse for those that moved between the ages of 10 and 17 years, since they were likely to have migrated by themselves, dropped out of school in order to do so and had little or no opportunities to continue with their education afterwards (McDonald et al, 2011).

Seasonal migration

Seasonal migration refers to temporary movement from one area to another and is particularly associated with sectors where there is not a steady flow of work throughout the year. This type of migration is closely associated with poverty and is often a very important livelihood strategy for people from rural areas (Silvey and Elmhirst, 2003). It typically consists of people who work in agriculture during peak planting and harvesting seasons but spend the rest of their time elsewhere, such as working in urban informal settings.
Evidence from across Asia suggests a close link between seasonal migration and educational disadvantage. Research from India has shown that children accompanying seasonal and circular internal migrants do not attend school, as school systems generally do not allow children to be absent for prolonged periods (Srivastava, 2011). In Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, about 40% of the children (aged 11–14) of short-term and seasonal migrants are out of school, compared with 15% of the children of permanent migrants, who have resided for over six months and can demonstrate permanent employment. Older youth are at even greater risk: 80% of short-term and seasonal migrants 15 to 18 years old were found to have dropped out of school, compared with 34% of permanent residents (World Bank, 2007).

In relation to the labour market and working conditions

Evidence suggests that the increased work opportunities which are available in urban areas may generate additional incentives for children to work, especially for recent migrant families still in transition and in situations where children are unable to access schools or lack access to basic services (ILO and UCW, 2010). In rural areas, migrant worker families are often paid by piece-work which can generate incentives to use children to increase outputs, particularly in situations where remuneration is too low to sufficiently support families, or where schools and basic services are difficult to access (Kou & van de Glind, 2013).

For children who do enter the labour market, evidence suggests that internal migrants face more disadvantages and increased vulnerabilities compared with non-migrants. According to research by the ILO, migrant child labourers receive less pay, work longer hours, attend school less often and face higher death rates at work in comparison to local child labourers (ILO, Migration and Child Labour - Essentials, 2011).

A study by McDonald et al (2011) based on data from the 2010 Greater Jakarta Transition to Adulthood Survey found that only a small minority of men and women who migrate to Jakarta as youth are ever able to move into formal sector employment, and that the majority remain self-employed or in casual work, typically working very long hours for very low wages. Mosse et al (2002), in a study on Bhil in western India, found that employers tended to prefer migrant workers because they would accept worse conditions than local labourers; and that migrant workers typically worked in hazardous environments with no protection against injury, no sick pay; no contribution to medical expenses and subject to low wages and unpaid overtime. A study into migrant adolescent girls found that limited human capital constrains migrant girls’ work opportunities and that migrant girls tend to enter the labour
market at younger ages and with less education compared with local urban girls, meaning that migrant girls who leave home to pursue employment often face limited job options and exploitative working conditions (Population Council, 2013).

In relation to living and housing conditions

Internal migrants are over-represented in urban informal settings; face problems in accessing services; and face basic challenges in accessing adequate sanitation (Sabates-Wheeler & Waite, 2003). Research from Sri Lanka has shown internal migrants who live in slum areas also face problems accessing schools for their children (Fernando, 2005). In situations where migrants tend to move to one particular area, it can place pressure on services and the labour market; creating tension with the local community, and also cause capacity problems for accessing services.

In Indonesia this is particularly pronounced in cities such as Jakarta where overcrowding makes it difficult to access services and high quality education because the city does not have the infrastructure to deal with the high numbers of internal migrants who move there (World Bank, 2003). A qualitative study by the SMERU Institute and UNICEF (2013) into the situation of children in North Jakarta, highlighted some of the issues associated with living in urban informal settings. Focusing on the example of Tanah Merah which is an informal settlement on disputed land where the majority of inhabitants are internal migrants, they showed that the environmental conditions were very poor including dense, crowded and unhealthy housing conditions; a lack of adequate sanitation facilities; and a lack of clean water supplies.

3 National context: internal child migration and child labour in Indonesia

This section combines statistical and anecdotal evidence to create a picture of internal child migration and child labour in Indonesia. The first part (3.1) establishes – as far as available data allows – the nature and extent of internal child migration in Indonesia and the characteristics of internal child migrants. The second part (3.2) provides an overview of the child labour situation in Indonesia with a particular focus on three sectors in which there are a significant number of internal child migrants: child domestic work, the urban informal economy and agriculture. In doing so, this section will build an understanding of the situations in which migrant children can be found in Indonesia and some of the risks to which they are exposed.
3.1 Internal child migration

Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia by a significant way. According to the 2010 population census, it had a total population of 238 million people spread across 34 provinces and 501 separate regencies and municipalities. The 2009 socioeconomic survey indicated that around a third of Indonesians were below the age of 18, whilst approximately 12% of Indonesians lived below the national poverty line in 2012\(^4\). Between and even within provinces there are huge disparities in terms of income, wealth and poverty – particularly between rural and urban areas. The population distribution between Indonesia’s various islands is also extremely uneven, with the island of Java carrying over 50% of the country’s population, despite being only 10% of its total landmass. The share of Indonesia’s urban population is projected to rise to almost one half by 2015 and to exceed two thirds by 2050. An estimated 65% of urban growth will be due to internal migration and only 35% to natural increase ((UN Statistics Division, 2009).

Indonesia’s government has historically placed few restrictions on internal migration, which has long resulted in large migration flows to urban areas, particularly on Java and parts of Bali (Hugo, 2003). One key exception to this rule has been Jakarta, which has intermittently – particularly during the 1970s – operated a ‘closed city’ policy that enabled non-registered internal migrants to be evicted from the city.

3.1.1 Data sources and limitations

The primary data and all of the graphs presented in this section are derived from a representative subset of the ‘Indonesia Population and Housing Census 2010’, harmonised and published by IPUMS International. The sample holds a tenth of the complete census data, stratified geographically by household. The data are self-weighting and the results below representative of the entire Indonesian population in 2010.

Internal migration is captured through a question asking respondents where they had lived five years ago – whereby a change of province or regency / municipality would indicate internal migration within the five years between 2005 and 2010. The question, unfortunately, is insufficient for capturing short-term or seasonal migration that may occur and be undone during the five-year period. Moreover, household heads are counted as living in a particular place so long as they return there once in every six-month period, which again leads to an omission of circular or seasonal migrants. This is an unfortunate lapse since field studies

\(^4\) World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2012*
demonstrate the widespread and rising incidence of circular migration in Indonesia over the past 20 years (Hugo, 2003), which the data contained here are unable to capture. Furthermore, those internal migrants who migrated internally after 2005 but subsequently either moved abroad or died before the 2010 census was taken could also not be captured in the present data. As such, the aggregate results presented below are very likely to underestimate the true extent of internal migration between 2005 and 2010 although they do provide the most accurate picture, based on the current data.

3.1.2 A profile of internal child migrants

According to the 2010 Census, some 4.31 million Indonesian’s above the age of five changed their regency or municipality within the same province between 2005 and 2010, whilst a further 5.13 million changed their province altogether. These 9.44 million internal migrants between 2005 and 2010 represent some 4.0% of the total population captured in the Census\(^5\). Within this overall figure, there were roughly 1.86 million children in Indonesia, aged between five and 17 in 2010, who had changed their province or regency / municipality at some point in the five years prior to 2010.

Although this figure is accurate for those children aged 5-17 in 2010, a more robust estimate should also include those internal child migrants who were born after 2005 as well as those who migrated and then turned 18 at some point after 2005. In order to correct for this, the missing values were estimated by taking a five-year average for all the possible ages the children might have been at the time of their migration and assuming these were evenly distributed in each of the five years between 2005 and 2010. Thus, for example, an internal child migrant who was 12 at the time of the Census, might have migrated at any age between eight and 12. To estimate the total number of those who were 12 at the time of migration, the estimate took one fifth from each of the five-year averages containing migratory 12-year-olds (i.e. 8-12, 9-13, 10-14, 11-15 and 12-16). The estimates for the different age groups 1-17 (no estimate was possible for those aged below one at the time of migration) were then summed to obtain the aggregate number, which was then divided by five to estimate the annual flows per age-group.

The estimated total number of internal child migrants (aged 0-17) that migrate within Indonesia between 2005 and 2010 is thus 2.63 million, based on the method outlined above.

\(^5\) The comparative figure for international migration during this period; according to the Census; was only 158,000 individuals, representing some 0.07% of the total population.
This figure represents an average annual flow of around 527,000 internal child migrants in Indonesia during each of the five years between 2005 and 2010, using the outlined method.

Disaggregating these estimates by gender and age reveals that both the male and female flows trough around the age of ten and increase steadily thereafter. Both the flows are fairly gender-balanced within the different age-groups up to the age of 13, beyond which the girls increasingly outnumber the boys (see Figure 1, below).

Figure 1. Estimated annual internal migration flows between 2005 and 2010, by age and gender (ages 5-18)

Disaggregating the estimates further by type of internal migration – whether it was between a regency or municipality within the same province (inter-municipal) or between two provinces entirely (inter-provincial) – shows fairly even flows for each age group (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Estimated annual internal migration flows between 2005 and 2010, by age and type (ages 5-18)

Looking now at the figures for internal child migrants by their actual age in 2010, it is possible to disaggregate them by their relationship to the household head in 2010, in order to gain some insight into the reason behind their move. The graph below thus shows the shares of internal child migrants’ within each age group by their relationship to the head of their household at the time of the census (Figure 3). As one might expect, the vast majority of
internal child migrants below the age of 12 are the child, stepchild, grandchild or child-in-law of their household head. What is surprising, however, is that this figure drops away sharply around the age of twelve, with many being replaced by ‘others’ (including relatives and non-relatives of the household head) and domestic servants. Live-in domestic servants peak around the age of 17, suggesting the bulk of internal child migrant domestic workers migrate between the age of 13 and 17. As for those internal child migrants who were themselves the head of their household in 2010 (or married / partnered to the head), they exceed 1% at the age of 14; account for 20% of internal child migrants by 18; and exceed 50% of them by 23.

Figure 3. Internal child migrants by age in 2010 and relationship to household head (ages 5-22)

Looking now at school attendance for different types of children – inter-municipal internal migrants, inter-provincial internal migrants and non-migrants – the graph below shows their school attendance rates, by their age in 2010. Whilst all three groups attended school at rates above 90% between the age of seven and 12, the attendance rate for inter-provincial internal migrants fell away sharply after that. What is surprising is that the inter-municipal child migrants seem to perform just as well as the non-migrants, whilst those who migrated between provinces did progressively worse from the age of 13. If not attending school can be taken as a proxy for child labour, this finding suggests that the most vulnerable children are those who migrate long distances, as opposed to those who move or stay within the same province.
Comparing all 5-17 year-olds in these three migration categories, we see the shares of those who never attended school are fairly even at 10% in all three groups and for boys as much as girls. Looking at the likelihood that they once attended school but no longer do, the figures are higher for internal child migrants than non-migrants and higher still for inter-provincial internal child migrants. As the graph also shows, the differences are even more pronounced for girls than they are for boys, indicating that they are at more risk of dropping out of school after and internal migration.

Figure 5. Shares of children by historical school attendance, gender and type of migrant (all 5-17-year-olds)

3.2 Child labour in Indonesia

According to the latest estimates, from 2009, there are approximately 4 million child labourers in Indonesia, including 1.4 million children aged 12 and below; 650,000 children aged 13-14 in non-light work; and 2 million 15-17 year olds in hazardous work (Understanding Children's Work (UCW) Programme, 2012). The available data does not

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6 Figures drawn from the 2009 Indonesia Child Labour Survey and 2009 Indonesia National Labour Force Survey)
differentiate according to migration status, making it difficult to obtain a reliable estimate of how many of these children are internal migrants.

This overall figure masks substantial differences in children’s employment rates between different regions (in Jakarta only 1% of children aged 10-14 were in employment in 2009, compared to 9% in Eastern Indonesia), as well as between rural and urban areas (only 3% of children from urban areas were in employment, compared with 8% in rural areas). An overall majority of working children are concentrated in the agricultural sector, which is also the sector which exposes children to the highest degree of hazards. Almost all of these children – 96% – work unpaid within their family unit.

Children in employment are less likely to attend school than those who are not in employment, and those that do attend school lag behind their non-working peers in terms of attendance and grade progression. By compromising education outcomes, children’s employment has significant and long-term negative effects, preventing children from acquiring the skills and qualifications needed for obtaining decent work when they reach the minimum age for employment.

In terms of gender distribution, girls are found to be slightly less likely to be in employment and slightly more likely to attend school than boys, although they spend more time carrying out household chores and are likely to be over-represented in sectors of work which are underestimated in household surveys, such as child domestic work.

Child labourers who work in migrant sensitive areas such as child domestic work, the urban informal sector and agriculture typically have limited access to formal social security provisions. This can make those above the minimum working age – aged 15-17 – particularly vulnerable to conditions which amount to child labour.

3.2.1 Policy and programme responses to child labour

Tackling child labour has been identified as a priority issue by the Indonesian government. Indonesia ratified ILO Convention No. 138 on Minimum Age for Employment in 1999 and ILO Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour in 2000. The minimum age for work at 15, the minimum age for hazardous work at 18 and children are specifically prohibited from working in the worst forms of child labour. However the Act excludes children who are self-employed or lack clear wage relationships, therefore excluding the majority of children in the three sectors which this chapter focuses on; child domestic work,
urban informal economy and agriculture; making children in these sectors particularly vulnerable to exploitation.

Indonesia has ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) 1989, which affirms that all children – regardless of their circumstance – should have the right to social security, including social insurance in accordance to national law (article 26). This represents a clear commitment that all children should be given a fair chance and an opportunity to reach their full potential and there are several complementary areas between social protection policies and programmes and combatting child labour.

The Government has however incorporated child labour issues into national development agendas, including the National Mid-Term Development Plan (2010-2014) which addresses the worst forms of child labour in domestic work, transportation, construction and mining and provides specific targets and budgetary allocations for action.

A National Action Plan on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour was finalised in 2002 and provides a broad framework for national actions in this area, aiming for absolute elimination by 2020 of all worst forms of child labour. The second phase was completed in 2012 and focused on promoting a positive policy and enabling environment for eliminating child labour, through building the knowledge base, improving legislative responses and raising awareness. It also involved direct and targeted interventions in four sectors; child domestic labour, children in plantations, trafficking for sexual exploitation and street children at risk of trafficking; through formal and non-formal education provisions and skills training.

In support of the national policy, action committees on child labour have been established in 22 of the 34 provinces in Indonesia to formulate local policies and programs that are appropriate to local conditions. A National Action Committee (NAC) for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour coordinates and monitors policy and program efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labour at the national level. Education is compulsory for nine years between the ages of seven and fifteen. Articles 48 and 53 of the Child Protection Act further specify that the government must provide a minimum of nine years basic education for all children and free education for all children.

3.2.3 Child domestic work

Child domestic work refers to paid or unpaid domestic work by children in households other than their own. It typically involves carrying out domestic chores such as cooking and cleaning, looking after other young children and caring for elderly people. Worldwide, the
The majority of child domestic workers are migrants – mostly internal – who typically have to move long distances away from their family to their employer’s home (ILO, 2013).

It is one of the most hazardous and least visible forms of child labour, characterised by extremely difficult conditions including low pay and long working hours where physical, verbal and even sexual abuse is common place. In many cases, children are additionally vulnerable as a result of their migration because they are isolated from their family and communities and more likely to be engaged as ‘live-in’ workers. This creates a situation of dependency vis-à-vis the employer’s family and means that child domestic workers have little recourse to help and support. One ILO study found that child domestic workers in Indonesia perform the same amount of work as adult workers and that the long working hours and lack of time for rest, recreation and socialising impacts on children’s mental, physical, social and intellectual development (ILO, Flowers on the Rock: Phenomenon of Child Domestic Workers in Indonesia, 2004). A 2009 investigation by Human Rights Watch found girls as young as 11 working as domestic workers in Indonesia; often lured from rural areas with false promises of high wages and without full details of the tasks and working conditions that would be expected of them (Human Rights Watch, 2009).

As in most other places in the world, domestic workers in Indonesia are not covered by national law and legislation to the same extent as other workers. This makes young domestic workers above the minimum age for employment particularly vulnerable to conditions which amount to child labour. For example, the Manpower Act of 2003 provides basic labour rights to formal sector worker - including a minimum wage, overtime pay, an eight-hour workday, weekly day of rest, vacation, and social security – but excludes informal workers, including domestic workers.

Figure 6 below shows the shares of children aged 5-17 whose relationship to their household head is that of a ‘domestic worker’ at the time of the 2010 Census. The bars clearly show that internal child migrants – both boys and girls – are more likely to be domestic workers than non-migrants. This likelihood was even greater for inter-provincial internal migrants than for inter-municipal ones. In fact; as the tallest bar in the figure below shows; some 11% of all inter-provincial girl-child migrant; who migrated between 2005 and 2010 and were

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7 The relevant question asked in the Census concerned all those “who live and eat in the respondent’s household and receive a wage/salary either in cash or in kind.” As further guidance, the question specified: “Only one relationship category can be selected even though, in fact, there is actually more than one relationship that exists between the household member and the head of household. For example, a family member who works as a maid (given wage/salary) or the child of a housemaid who also lives in the household of the respondent and treated like a maid is also considered a housemaid of the household…”
aged 5-17 in 2010; were employed as domestic workers. The absolute figures include as many as 81,000 girls in 2010 who migrated internally after 2005 to work as domestic employees, compared with only 65,000 of those who did not migrate at all. This finding implies that the demand for internal child migrant domestic workers is higher than non-migrant ones, both in absolute and relevant terms.

Figure 6. Shares of child domestic workers by gender and type of migration (all 5-17-year-olds)

3.2.4 Street children in the urban informal economy

The urban informal economy is closely associated with rural-urban migration and with the phenomenon of ‘street children’. At a national level, UNICEF has estimated that the number of street children in Indonesia has increased rapidly over the last few decades; from around 50,000 in the late 1990s to 230,000 in 2008, and that they are particularly concentrated in large urban areas such as Jakarta. While it is not known how many of these children are internal migrants it is clear that the gap in opportunities between rural and urban areas, leading to migration, as a key cause of the growth of street children. Situational analysis conducted by UNICEF (2011) found that children involved in this sector are involved in a number of occupations including street vending, scavenging, begging and shoe polishing. Furthermore, children living on the streets generally have no adult protection and are therefore more vulnerable to further violations such as trafficking and sexual exploitation. Lack of access to services and education opportunities, and often bear the burden for being primary breadwinners for their families (UNICEF, 2011).

3.2.5 Fishing and Agriculture

The agriculture sector accounts for by far the largest share of children’s employment in Indonesia (Understanding Children's Work (UCW) Programme, 2012). Although the exact number is unclear, anecdotal evidence suggests that this includes a number of internal migrants (Hugo, 2003). This type of work involves exposure to many hazards including extreme temperatures, pesticides, and dangerous machinery. It typically requires working
long hours and carrying out heavy, strenuous work, making agriculture one of the most hazardous sectors for children to work in.

In Indonesia, plantation work is a particularly common form of agriculture for children to be involved in, producing tobacco, rubber and palm oil. Plantations – particularly for rubber production - are typically located a long distance from the nearest settlements and have few facilities or services on offer. This can make it difficult to access schools and medical facilities. This is exacerbated by the fact that the distribution of health facilities between rural and urban areas is imbalanced: the majority of government hospitals are located in district capitals, limiting their access to rural residents, who instead have to rely on health centres as the basic source of primary care (Yao Lu, 2008).

An ILO study into child labour in tobacco plantations in Indonesia found that although most came from villages surrounding the plantation, others had moved from other districts or provinces to work. In common with the situation in much of the agricultural sector, none of the children in the study had a direct contractual relationship with the employer, but rather worked in order to help their parents meet quotas (ILO, 2010). There are also particularly high numbers of boys recruited from villages to work on off-shore fishing platforms (Jermal). These boys face particular difficulties and vulnerabilities because they are isolated, have no possibility to attend school and have to cope with extremely challenging living and working conditions.

4 Indonesia’s social protection system

This section conducts a detailed assessment of Indonesia’s social protection system in terms of its effectiveness in tackling child labour and in reaching vulnerable internal child migrants. This exercise is closely informed by the ILO’s recent assessment of the social protection situation in Indonesia which was conducted from April 2011 to November 2012 in close collaboration with Bappenas (Ministry of National Development Planning) (ILO, 2012).

4.1 Overview of social protection policies and programmes in Indonesia

Provisions for formal social protection in Indonesia expanded rapidly following the 1997-1998 East Asian financial crisis, during which the country experienced profound economic hardship coupled with severe political and social upheaval. As a result of the crisis inflation went from less than 8% in 1996 to 61% in 1998; economic growth from 8% in 1996 to -14%
in 1997; GDP per capita almost halved from USD 1,155 in 1996 to USD 665 by end of 1998; and by the government’s estimates poverty rates jumped from 11% to 40% (UNDP, 2009).

The government’s response to the protracted crisis aimed explicitly at helping the poor and vulnerable to cope with economic hardship through a package of social protection interventions, including cash transfers and food subsidies. Although these initiatives were introduced in an ad hoc fashion and aimed at reacting to circumstances rather than addressing underlying risks and vulnerability, they provided the basis for social protection to become a more permanent part of the policy landscape.

Today, the right to social protection is explicitly enshrined in law: a 2002 amendment to the constitution recognised the right to social security for all; and the National Social Security Law (40/2004) further mandates the extension of social security coverage to the whole population in the areas of health, work injury, old age and the death of the breadwinner, following a ‘staircase approach’ by which the poor are provided with basic and non-contributory benefits; nominal contributions for informal workers; and statutory social security schemes for formal sector workers. However an estimated 13% of the poorest quintile of Indonesians and 44% of households in which at least one child under 15 is working do not receive any form of social protection, which at present focuses primarily on formal sector employees.

Access to education, particularly for girls, has been explicitly prioritised in social protection policies and programmes, through direct assistance to schools, scholarships and cash transfers which are conditional on school enrolment. A qualitative study on North Jakarta funded by the SMERU institute found that the absence of birth certificates amongst children who had migrated between provinces made it difficult for children to be enrolled in school. For state schools having a birth certificate is a pre-requisite for admission meaning that often the only available choice was to enroll in a private school (SMERU Institute and UNICEF, 2013).

**Effects of decentralisation**

Drastic political decentralisation took place in 2001 and provincial and even district level officials took on significant responsibility for the development and implementation of social protection, often resulting in significant differences between areas in the services that are offered. Eligibility for such schemes depends on holding official residence in a particular district or province, as designated on National and Household ID cards.
The process of changing the place of residence on ID cards is cumbersome, and often prohibitively expensive for many of the most vulnerable internal migrants. For children it is even more difficult because they are not entitled to an individual national ID card until they are aged 17, meaning that some young workers who are above the minimum age for employment are precluded from accessing social protection schemes. For people that only migrate seasonally, the process of continually changing official registration is even more problematic. This results in a situation where even ‘de facto’ residents are unable to access social protection schemes, particularly in Jakarta which operates a ‘closed city’ policy and has particularly stringent registration requirements; requiring proof of employment and housing and to deposit with the city government the equivalent of the return fare to their point of origin (UNDP, 2009). A study by SMERU and UNICEF into the situation of children in North Jakarta looked at the case study example of Tanah Merah which is a slum located on disputed land. The majority of residents are internal migrants and face acute difficulties in accessing social protection services because the existence of the slum is not recognised by the local administration office, making it extremely difficult to obtain the necessary identification and residence documents (SMERU Institute and UNICEF, 2013).

Some of the programmes which are in operation at a local level are directly relevant for tackling child labour, including in Yogyakarta, where there is a “retrieval program” for drop out children, which allows students who have dropped out to return to school for free. Or indirectly, such as the health insurance card which has been rolled out in Jakarta using funding from the Jamkesda scheme. A persistent problem with local schemes such as this is that they only target children who are official residents of the city; proven through showing Identification Cards (Kartu Tanda Penduduk) or Household Information Cards (Kartu Keluarga); meaning that many vulnerable internal migrants are not eligible (Human Rights Watch, 2009).

**Main national and provincial social protection schemes**

The table on the following pages provides a preliminary assessment of Indonesia’s main social protection schemes in terms of their relevance in tackling child labour and their effectiveness in reaching internal child migrants.
**Table 1: Overview of the most relevant schemes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme and details</th>
<th>Relevance for tackling child labour</th>
<th>Access for internal child migrants</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School assistance programme (BOS: Bantuan Operasional Sekolah)</td>
<td>Helps to increase education quality; and improve access by ensuring that the costs of running schools do not need to be passed onto students.</td>
<td>Provides funding directly to schools rather than to individuals so issues of internal migration are not directly relevant. However, since it only reaches those who are enrolled in school, it does not always include internal migrants, who face a variety of internal and external barriers to enrolling in school.</td>
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<td>Provides block grants to schools with the aim of guaranteeing free basic education from grades one to nine. In 2012 it covered 44.7 million students in 200,000 schools with elementary schools receiving Rp 580,000 (USD 65) per student and junior secondary schools receiving Rp 710,000 (USD 79).</td>
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<td>Scholarships for poor students (BSM: Bantuan Siswa Miskin)</td>
<td>Supports children from poor households to continue their education. However evidence suggests that the subsidies are not enough to cover the costs of schooling and so the effects on enrolment rates have been minimal (World Bank, 2012).</td>
<td>Targeting is carried out on an ad hoc basis, typically by head-teachers or local education offices, with no systematic procedures in place to reach the most vulnerable. There is no formal system in place to ensure portability in cases where children move schools.</td>
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<td>Supports poor students from primary to university level; reaching 6.3 million in 2012; by directly dispersing money to students via the postal service.</td>
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<td>Mandatory public health insurance (Jamkesmas: Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat)</td>
<td>Strengthens the resilience of families and reduces poverty by reducing out-of pocket health expenses.</td>
<td>Benefits are fully portable between locations, meaning that internal migrants do not lose their entitlements when they move. From 2008 the programme began to allow people who did not hold identity cards – including abandoned children, and the homeless – to be covered by the programme. However this is dependent on obtaining a letter of recommendation letter from a local social affairs agency which may be problematic for children, particularly those which have migrated independently.</td>
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<td>Covers approximately 32% of the population and provides the poor and near-poor with free health care services in community health centres, basic wards in government hospitals and some designated private hospitals.</td>
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<td>Provisional public health insurance scheme (Jamkesda: Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah)</td>
<td>In practice there is a messy distinction between the local and national schemes and many poor people are eligible for both, since the two schemes use completely different criteria. There is no formal system in place to ensure portability in cases where people move.</td>
<td>Funds are allocated through local governments at the provincial and district levels, resulting in significant discrepancies between provinces and districts in the access to the scheme.</td>
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<td>Poor people who are identified as poor but are not provided for by Jamkesmas, either because of data errors, or because they recently became poor. According to the Ministry of Health it covers 13.5% of the population.</td>
<td>Separate databases and have no mechanisms to crosscheck.</td>
<td>Level in the type of protection that is offered and in the contribution requirements. Because they are linked to particular areas, these benefits are not portable and people are not eligible to receive treatment outside of the province or district in which they are registered.</td>
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<td>Conditional Cash Transfer Programme (PKH: Programme Keluarga Harapan) Children are the primary beneficiaries and targets of this programme, which in 2012 covered 33 provinces and 1.5 million very poor households and is expected to reach 3 million households across every district and province by 2014. Depending on the household structure, cash transfers of around IDR 600,000 – 2,200,000 are given on condition of meeting relevant programme conditions, including that; children are enrolled in school and have at least 85% attendance; and pregnant and lactating mothers and infants regularly visit health facilities for check-ups.</td>
<td>Contains a small child labour sub-programme (PPA-PKH: Pengurangan Pekerja Anak untuk Mendukung Program Keluarga Harapan) which gives tailored support and assistance – including motivational and academic training - to the children of families covered by the PKH programme who have dropped out of school to work, to return to school. In 2012 the programme reached 10,750 children across 84 districts in 71 provinces. No direct studies on the effectiveness of the scheme on reducing child labour. Indirect studies have shown that PKH did not have an effect on enrolment rates, dropout rates, or transition rates due to poor timing, relatively small benefits, and lack of outreach to school-leavers (World Bank, 2012).</td>
<td>Recipients of the PKH programme are required to have KTP (identification cards) and KK (family cards) which identify them as residents of the area they are receiving benefits. This means that many poor households who are migrants to an area are not eligible to receive the benefits and that benefits are not portable between locations. Databases are maintained and updated on an irregular basis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Children’s Social Welfare Programme (PKSA: Program Kesejahteraan Sosial Anak) Provides conditional cash transfers to children who are in need of special attention and support, including; abandoned infants/infants with special needs (five years or younger), abandoned children (6-18 years old), street children (6-18 years old), children with criminal charges (6-16 years old) and children with disabilities (0-18 years old). The conditions for receiving the money vary between groups but typically require a commitment to stay in school, stop working on the street, or to stop participating in criminal activity. Conditionalities may include children have to leave child labour, and it reaches out to the most vulnerable children. No direct studies on the effectiveness of the scheme on reducing child labour. Benefits only reach children in the second half of the school year, but school related expenditures are biggest at the beginning of the school year (World Bank, 2012)</td>
<td>Children who migrate internally are eligible to receive benefits under the terms of this scheme. However, there is no formal targeting or monitoring system in place; recipients are identified by NGOs or social organisations; and the programme only covers a fraction of those in need.</td>
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5 Conclusion

Although consensus is growing that social protection is crucial to reducing child labour, its effectiveness depends on the context and, in particular, on the characteristics of the children being targeted. This paper has focused on the example of internal child migrants in Indonesia and demonstrated the specific vulnerabilities that they face and highlighted the areas where current social protection provisions are failing to meet their needs. In so doing, this paper underlines the need for the issue of internal child migration to be better integrated into social protection policies and programmes in Indonesia; through improving the responsiveness of existing schemes and developing tailor-made interventions which are specifically suited to the unique needs of internal migrants, underpinned by a robust body of research and evidence.

Millions of children and young people migrate internally within Indonesia every year, very often in pursuit of greater opportunities, and improve their economic position and increase their future potential as a result. For others – particularly those from poor families – internal migration is associated with a heightened vulnerability to exploitative child labour, particularly when migration is undertaken independently or seasonally. In Indonesia, particularly significant numbers of internal child migrants can be found working in agriculture, in the urban informal economy and in domestic work. Very little policy attention has been given to how to most effectively address the unique risks and vulnerabilities that these children face.

While there are no official statistics on the number of internal migrants who are involved in child labour, data from the Indonesia Population and Housing Census 2010 gives some indication as to the extent of the problem and the characteristics of the children involved. For example, this data shows that the majority of children who migrate internally do so after the age of 12; and that they are significantly less likely to attend school than non-migrants. This data also reveals an important gender dimension of the migration process and that a significant number of girls who migrate do so for the purpose of domestic work.

In Indonesia there are several social protection programmes which have direct relevance for child labour elimination efforts: direct cash transfers which boost incomes, conditionalities which create positive incentives for school attendance; health insurance schemes which boost household resilience; grants which improve school quality and scholarships which support children to attend school. However there is very little direct evidence on the efficacy of these
particular schemes in tackling child labour and no mechanisms in place to track the outcomes for beneficiaries, making it difficult to make robust conclusions of what works and under what circumstances.

Internal child migrants face numerous direct and indirect barriers in accessing and benefitting from these schemes. Most significant among these are stringent registration requirements which make it difficult for certain types of migrant to access social protection schemes in their new location. This is further compounded by the lack of portability of social protection benefits and the lack of an effective appeals mechanism.

These conclusions are particularly timely in the context of the on-going expansion and extension of Indonesia’s social protection system, which offers ample opportunity for the needs of internal child migrants to be taken into consideration and for social protection to play a full and active role in eliminating exploitative child labour in Indonesia. This is particularly true given that internal migrants make up such a significant proportion of the population, achieving social protection for all is unlikely to be possible without taking steps to reach out to them.

6 Recommendations

This section sets forth a range of policy recommendations designed to overcome the multitude of direct and indirect barriers facing migrant children in accessing social protection that is adequate and appropriate for their needs. Together, these recommendations highlight the need for the continued expansion and development of a comprehensive and sustainably financed social protection system in which the goal of child labour elimination is embedded into the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation processes.

6.1 Strengthen the research and evidence base

There are still significant knowledge gaps that need to be filled in order for the linkages between child labour, internal migration and social protection to be fully understood. In order to facilitate more effective and better targeted policies the following should be pursued:

- Develop robust beneficiary databases which track outcomes; including in relation to child labour; over time. This will facilitate more effective targeting and monitoring and also allow for robust evaluations to take place.
- Collect better and richer information on internal child migration in Indonesia; including through developing techniques to accurately measure the extent of seasonal and independent migration; to monitor migration flows and allow for disaggregation by relevant variables such as age, gender and poverty; focused qualitative research with internal migrant children to better
understand their specific needs in relation to social protection programmes. Particular emphasis should be given to developing techniques to collect information on migrants in hard to reach sectors such as child domestic work.

- Conduct research into the broader relationship between migration, social protection and child labour, including into the situation of children who are ‘left behind’ when their parents migrate, the impacts on children who live in areas which are affected by particularly high rates of inward or outward migration, and on less tangible outcomes such as how internal migration affects family decision making structures.
- Identify examples of promising practices and lessons learned from district or provincial level schemes, with potential for successful schemes to be scaled up or rolled out nationally.

6.2 Improve responsiveness of existing social protection programmes

There are several ways in which the existing social protection schemes could become more accessible and responsive to the unique needs of internal child migrants:

- Regularise the status of de facto residents by simplifying the procedures for officially registering in new districts and provinces, and through the development of specific procedures for seasonal migrants, which will enable access to provincial and district level social protection schemes in their place of permanent resident and place of migration.
- Ensure that migrant children are able to take advantage of the services and increased opportunities that are on offer at their place of destination, including through: awareness raising and pre-departure training, development of a single window service, which will make it easier for migrants to be informed of their entitlements; mapping of the specific social protection interventions which are available in specific districts and provinces which is regularly updated and readily accessible by service users.
- In relation to provincial level schemes such as BSM, PKH and Jamkesmas: develop mechanisms to enable full portability and smooth transfers between provinces and districts.
- In relation to PKSA: Include specific reference to vulnerable internal child migrants – including those who migrate independently and seasonally – as children who should be targeted.

6.3 Develop customised social protection interventions for internal child migrants

The development of specific social protection programmes for internal child migrants with an overall focus on children who are particularly vulnerable but are not provided for by existing social protection schemes.

- For 15-17 year old who are above the minimum age for employment: support to migrate safely and find decent work opportunities, through skills training, job linking and pre-departure training. Particular focus should be given to migrant sensitive sectors such as agriculture and domestic work.
- For children who are 15 and below and under the minimum age for employment: develop programmes to support migrant children to attend schools, with a particular focus on children who have particular difficulties in accessing traditional schooling opportunities. This could include setting up worksite schools for children in agriculture; and flexible, non-formal schooling for child domestic workers. Sensitisation of child labour monitoring process to issues relating to internal child migration and referral to appropriate schemes, particularly in sectors where large numbers of migrant children work.
- For independent child migrants: reduce isolation and vulnerability on arrival by providing safe places for young migrants to stay; mentoring schemes; and drop-in centres. This should give particular attention to girls, given evidence that they have fewer support networks.
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